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Daniel J. Mahoney

1968 and the Meaning of Democracy

During a recent visit to France, I had an
opportunity to witness the ongoing French
commemorations of the “May events” that
shook that country to the core forty years
ago. Parisian bookstores prominently displayed a massive literature on those events,
while magazines were filled with nostalgic evocations of the three or four weeks
that are said to have changed the world.
Le Monde, the house journal of the establishment Left, went so far as to reproduce,
each day, the front page of the newspaper
on the parallel day in May 1968. Those
old front pages perfectly captured both
the obligatory leftism and the indulgence
toward “Youth” that dominated that venerable paper’s response to the implosion
of the French social and political order.
One article by Maurice Duverger was
representative of the atmosphere of 1968:
that famous political scientist cheerfully
seconded the student movement’s call for
the abolition of exams, since examinations took professors away from precious
scientific research and at the same time
reinforced the alienation of the young. In
the giddy, carnival-like atmosphere of the
time, this passed for serious analysis.
Today, a majority of the French (or at
least of the French intellectual class)—and
not all of them on the Left—look back
nostalgically to the “turning point” that
4

was May 1968. Some of this is the self-indulgence of a generation that is no longer
so young. Some of it is compensation by a
Left that now reluctantly admits that revolution, even of a “mimetic” kind, is no longer a serious option for France and Europe.
But the “commemorative” character of the
French response to the fortieth anniversary of the May events risks obscuring the
farcical dimensions of that eruption; more
seriously, it risks obscuring 1968’s truly
revolutionary and ideological dimensions
as well. Lost in the celebration of 1968 as
the birth pangs of an unproblematic “postmodern democracy” is a concrete feel for
the nature of the event itself.

A Global Phenomenon
We often forget that “1968” was a truly
global phenomenon. Americans easily recall Berkeley and Columbia, and Europeans recall Paris and the Sorbonne. But that
momentous year also saw unrest in Dakar,
Mexico City, Tokyo, and elsewhere: the
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rise of a revolutionary New Left throughstructures” in the years immediately before
out the Western world, and in a different
1968. Everywhere an ideology of liberation
key the quasi-miraculous “Prague Spring”
challenged the old bourgeois ethos of selfin Soviet-dominated Czechoslovakia. The
command and self-control. “1968” was in
latter gave undue hope to some on the Left
some important respects an explosion in a
that Leninist-Stalinist tyranny could be
dramatic process already well under way
transformed into “socialism with a human
rather than the unanticipated announceface.”
ment of a new world.
There were both general and particular causes at work. “1968” surely had deep
roots in cultural and social developments
May 1968
that were in the process of transforming
Despite these major social and culturthe entire Western world. After the Second
al transformations, nothing in France
Vatican Council (1962-1965), for example,
seemed particularly out of the ordinary on
the Roman Catholic Church suffered
the eve of May 1968.1 No one anticipated
that ongoing disputes about the organizafrom self-inflicted wounds. That hoary
tion of the French university system would
institution transformed itself seemingly
give rise to momentous social and politiovernight from an authoritative bastion
of traditional wisdom
to a church in apparent freefall. Its “progressivist” elements did
not hesitate “to kneel
before the world,” celebrating socialism and
revolution, secular humanitarianism,
and
every “democratic” development in society at
large. In America, the
moral promise of the
civil rights movement,
Paris, May 1968: violence at the carnival
rooted in an appeal to
cal upheavals. Unrest at the University of
American principles of liberty and equalNanterre, fueled by the activism of anarity bolstered by biblical religion, were cochist revolutionaries led by Daniel Cohnopted by the Black Power movement and
Bendit, soon spread to the Sorbonne. In
other manifestations of identity politics.
the days after May 3, that august instituThe Women’s Liberation movement and
tion was more or less commandeered by
the recently manufactured birth control
student radicals. Students clashed with
pill (it was introduced in France in 1967)
police even as they—and sympathetic
conspired, for better or worse, to sever sexprofessors—“contested” the traditional
uality from a natural order and individual
structures of state and society. Student
liberty from its larger familial and social
protesters combined violence with a festive
contexts. In France, social institutions as
atmosphere celebrating their emancipation
diverse as the Church and the Boy Scouts
from traditional educational obligations
scrambled to adopt less hierarchical “power
the intercollegiate review / Fall 2008

5

Daniel J. Mahoney / 1968 and the Meaning of Democracy

and social and cultural restraints. In the
face of this rapidly deteriorating situation
(and of public opinion’s remarkable indulgence toward the student “revolutionaries”), the government of Prime Minister
Pompidou began to lose nerve.
The initial student phase of the May
events was followed by a nation-wide general strike (of up to ten million workers)
that lasted two weeks and shut down the
economic life of the country. This second,
“economic” phase of the crisis was followed
by a “political phase” that lasted from
May 27 until May 30. For the first time, it
looked like the strong, self-respecting constitutional order inaugurated by Charles
de Gaulle in 1958 might collapse under the
combined assaults of a student revolution,
a general strike, and the machinations of
leftist political forces. A takeover by the
Communist Party and other “popular”
forces became a real possibility for the first
time. It was only on May 30 that France
began to step back from the abyss.
After initial hesitations—and a lackluster television address on May 24—President de Gaulle seized the initiative with a
truly decisive radio address to the nation
on May 30, 1968.2 He announced his decision to dissolve the National Assembly
and to call for elections. He denounced
the “intimidation, intoxication, and tyranny” exercised by various revolutionary
groups as well as the danger posed by a
“party which is a totalitarian enterprise.”
He lamented the fact that as a result of this
intimidation teachers were prevented from
teaching, students from studying, and
workers from working. And he reassured
the French people that “the Republic will
not abdicate.” Hundreds of thousands of
citizens responded to de Gaulle’s radio address by descending on the Champs Élysées for a massive rally in support of the
Republic. The tide had now turned. The
general strike began to run out of steam.
6

It took another couple of weeks (and three
“nights of the barricades”) for order to
be restored to the Sorbonne and the Left
Bank. In the elections at the end of June,
the Gaullists for the first time won an absolute majority in the National Assembly.
Things had come full circle.
We have noted that revolutionaries of
the Left (Trotskyites and Maoists of various stripes) played a major role in radicalizing the student movement. These subterranean revolutionary “groupuscules”
outmaneuvered the Communist Party and
claimed to speak for the young as a whole.
Some of these militants (André Glucksmann, Bernard-Henri Lévy, and the other
“new philosophers” of media fame come to
mind) later broke with revolutionary ideology and became vocal defenders of “the
rights of man.” These soixante-huitards
(’68ers) now tend to read their own intellectual and political trajectory into the
nature of the event itself. They remain
partisans of 1968 even in their new centrist or even conservative incarnations.
But in truth there is an element of bad
faith and wishful thinking informing the
“libertarian” reading of 1968. The “libertarianism” of 1968 directed nearly all its
anti-authoritarian ire at bourgeois society
and was remarkably indulgent toward the
totalitarianism of the Left. The “Marxist
consensus” so abundantly on display that
year did not at the time reflect the slightest
clarity about the real nature of communist
totalitarianism. That was to come later,
under the impact of Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag
Archipelago, a work that had a much more
dramatic impact in France than anywhere
else in the Western world.

Aron’s Witness
In retrospect, it is easy to forget the massive abdication of good sense by so many
who ought to have known better during
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the course of the May events. The great
exception was the French political philosopher, sociologist, and journalist Raymond Aron. His columns in Le Figaro and
his lively, eloquent, and insightful book La
revolution introuvable (The Elusive Revolution) were beacons of clarity and civic
courage in the midst of the “revolutionary
psychodrama” (as he pointedly called it at
the time).3 Aron was the first to expose the
“imitative” character of students and intellectuals play-acting at revolution, risking
the destruction of bourgeois society and
the liberal university with little or nothing constructive to offer in their place. He
recalled Flaubert’s and Tocqueville’s powerful critiques of the revolution of 1848
(where a similar “literary politics” guided the pseudo-Jacobins of that time) to
highlight the French propensity to make
revolution in the place of a serious effort
to bring about reforms.4 A man of remarkably balanced judgment, Aron was angered
by the inability and unwillingness of those
in positions of responsibility to resist the
delirium of the time. In The Elusive Revolution he eloquently defends his refusal to
“take too seriously” the various actors in
the “revolutionary comedy”:
I refuse to salute our “admirable youth.”
Too many grown men have done so. Barricades which are symbolically effective
seem to me to be neither an intellectual
nor a moral achievement. If young people have some exalted memory of the
barricades, well and good. Why should
old people be obliged to counterfeit
sentiments which they do not feel? If
the young denounce the brutality of the
C.R.S. (the French riot police) while in
the same breath preaching the cult of
violence themselves, the contradiction
seems to me to be nothing more than a
good technique of subversion. But men
of my generation or of the generation

after do not want to feel that they were
caught up in what I persist in calling
collective madness. They do not accept
that they are out of their minds.5

Aron had long been a critic of the
over-centralized and overcrowded French
university system and had even left the
Sorbonne “in disgust,” as he put it, some
months before May ’68. And while he respected General de Gaulle as an authentically great man, he also freely acknowledged the limits of Gaullist hauteur, the
quasi-monarchical style that had set the
tone for the French Fifth Republic. He
was also critical of the civil service authoritarianism of the Fifth Republic’s governing class and of the quasi-neutralist bent
of French foreign policy.
In Aron’s view, the Fifth Republic was
a liberal order that respected fundamental political and personal liberties. But
its approach to governing was excessively
aloof and oligarchic and thus insufficiently “republican” in character. A necessary strengthening of executive authority
had led to an excessive depoliticization
of French society. Still, if Aron could not
simply accept the Gaullist vision of France
he personally felt “closer to the Gaullists
than to their opponents.” He was “deeply
wounded by” 1968’s “radical negation of
patriotism and by the substitution of the
name of Che Guevara for that of a resistance hero [Charles de Gaulle].”6
Unfortunately, Aron’s voice was largely
absent from the French commemoration
of the May events (although the distinguished French quarterly Commentaire,
founded by Aron in 1978, published an
excerpt from La revolution introuvable and
two broadly Aronian reflections on the
May events in its Summer 2008 issue).
This relative absence of Aron’s perspective
in the contemporary debate is problematic
for several reasons. Aron’s writings on 1968
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serve as a powerful corrective to the ongoing French tendency to become “obsessed
by their memories or the myths of their
past” and to mistake “riots and disorder”
in the streets of Paris “for a Promethean
exploit.” In addition, Aron’s writings on
1968 make abundantly clear what was at
stake in the final “revolutionary” days of
May before de Gaulle’s May 30 radio address awoke the good sense of France’s silent majority.
There were only two plausible political
alternatives to the Fifth Republic. The first
was the rule of a “totalitarian enterprise,”
the Communist Party, which had been
driven by the power vacuum at the end of
May to call for a “popular government” (a
government of the Left, dominated by the
Communist Party). The second possibility was the establishment of a Sixth French
Republic headed by an official of the noncommunist Left such as François Mitterrand or Pierre Mendès-France. Such a republic would be the product of lawlessness
and would be “truly unworthy” of a selfrespecting people and nation. As we have
seen, Aron was ambivalent about the established political regime in France. Yet he
vigorously supported the continuity of the
legal government. The Gaullist republic
“was based on universal suffrage” and did
not violate “fundamental liberties.”7 All of
the available political alternatives—generalized lawlessness, communist despotism,
or a power play by the opposition—were
much less acceptable.
One can continue this sort of analysis.
The distinguished French historian Alain
Besançon has written a masterful new
memoir on May ’68 that appeared in the
aforementioned Summer 2008 issue of
Commentaire.8 As Besançon observes, the
Communist Party did not really want revolution. In part it feared the abyss opened
up by a truly revolutionary situation; in
part the French Communist Party and its
8

Soviet masters were broadly satisfied with
de Gaulle’s “independent” foreign policy.
There was an implicit “pact” between the
Gaullists and the Communists that had
served to maintain order in France. But at
the time there was no guarantee that that
pact would hold. And, in fact, after May
27, the pact had dangerously frayed. The
Communists, stung by the opposition of
their own rank-and-file union members
to the Grenelle accords (dramatic concessions offered by the Pompidou government
to put an end to the general strike), and by
revolutionary agitation on the ultra-Left,
were increasingly prepared to cross the
Rubicon—to engage in real revolutionary
action. De Gaulle was not being demagogic in his speech to the nation on May
30: he genuinely feared that a Communist takeover was a distinct possibility in
France. On the eve of the May 30 address,
such anti-communist stalwarts (and critics
of May ’68) as Aron, Annie Kriegel, and
Alain Besançon seriously contemplated the
possibility of going into exile if everything
was indeed lost. Elegiac French accounts
of 1968 as a legitimate “democratic” protest against Gaullist authoritarianism and
the stifling conformities of a hierarchical
social order therefore grossly obscure the
political stakes of the May events. “1968”
was much more than an “eruption of the
social” as so many analysts suggest today.
In May 1968 a “revolutionary psychodrama”—a seemingly harmless talkfest—
brought France, and France alone in the
Western world, perilously close to a genuine revolutionary conflagration.

The Thought of ’68
Besançon has perceptively noted the yawning gap between the heady language in
which the actors of 1968 expressed themselves and the “uniformity” of that event’s
consequences. Understanding that gap is
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crucial to deciphering the “mystery” and
“ambiguity” of 1968. The May events did
not have a single or uniform profile. The
remarkably juvenile slogans—“Demand
the impossible,” “It is forbidden to forbid,”
“Take your desires for realities”—in themselves are without any serious intellectual
interest or content. They are, however,
revealing popular expressions of a deepseated antinomianism connected to the
thought underlying 1968.
To the extent that the movement had a
coherent ideological profile it can be found
in the conjunction of the philosophy current in France in the 1960s—“structuralist,” Byzantine, obscure—with a diffuse
“leftist” ideology that paid homage to
Mao, Trotsky, and Castro. This ideology
had its “hard” core in the revolutionary
“groupuscules” mentioned above, which
played a major role in radicalizing events
in both the universities and the factories.
This ideology’s “soft” core was anti-authoritarian and anti-hierarchical, what
might broadly be called “left-libertarian”
in orientation. In both its soft and hard
manifestations, the radicals of 1968 evoked
a revolutionary alternative to bourgeois society that somehow would not culminate
in Soviet-style bureaucratic despotism (by
now, the Soviet Union seemed hopelessly
“petrified” to them).
The partisans of 1968 were mesmerized
by the vision of “direct democracy” in an
industrial society and appealed to “participation” (“autogestion”) as the only legitimate
governing principle within every educational, social, economic, and political institution.9 Authority as such was identified
with domination and repression. Of course,
this overlooked elementary social realities
and necessities. Aron nicely highlights the
“scorn for facts,” for elementary social realities, that underlay the radically egalitarian
vision of the Parisian intellectuals:

Many higher intellectuals have an incredible scorn for facts. The formula
“there are no facts” is much acclaimed
in Parisian circles. Of course, I am
aware that in a sense this formula is
philosophically true. There are no facts
which have not been construed from
documents by an historian. I am aware
of this kind of consideration—after all,
I began my career as a philosopher by
making speculations of this kind. But
when all is said and done at times I am
tempted to...state that every society is
subject to the constraints of fact—the
need for production, for organization,
for technical hierarchy, the need for
techno-bureaucracy and so on. French
intellectuals are so subtle that they end
up by forgetting the obvious.10

In a famous book that has given rise
to endless polemics, La pensée de 68,11 the
French philosophers Luc Ferry and Alain
Renault analyzed “the thought of ’68,” the
anti-humanist philosophical currents that
preceded, informed, and were given new
life by the revolutionary spectacle of that
year. Some of Ferry and Renault’s critics
have vociferously denied that thinkers such
as Foucault, Derrida, and Lacan had much
of a “causal” role in the May events. Their
writings were too abstract to influence a
broader public and some of them (Foucault
in particular) were initially skeptical of the
students and their motives. But all of this
is beside the point. Ferry and Renault did
not claim that “anti-humanism” or sophisticated Parisian nihilism caused the May
events. They made the more limited and
plausible claim that the French philosophy
of the 1960s created an atmosphere that
nourished the spirit of ’68 and informed
the actions of many of its key players. In
important respects, Ferry and Renault were
merely developing an insight that Aron had
already highlighted in The Elusive Revolu-
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tion (they cite him generously at a crucial
moment in their book).
As Aron noted in the midst of the
events, Parisian intellectuals (with a few
notable exceptions) succumbed to nihilism
of a particularly crude variety when they
confused their “critical function” with an
“absolute condemnation of society.” They
practiced—even perfected—the “literary
politics” of the revolution of 1848 that had
been condemned by Tocqueville in his Recollections. Too many preached or tolerated
“the cult of pure violence” with no thought
of an alternative society except a vague vision of a radiant future without hierarchy
or vertical structures of authority. At the
same time, the same figures showed limitless indulgence (and fascination) toward
murderous tyrants in far-off lands about
which they knew little or nothing.
Forsaking the Stalinism of old, Parisian
intellectuals succumbed to a gauchisme
tinged by the fashionable intellectual nihilism of the day. And in the midst of the
crisis, the “cult of action” associated with
the existentialist-cum-Marxist Jean-Paul
Sartre, made a (temporary) comeback on
the streets of Paris. Aron writes:
The god of the intellectuals of the sixties was no longer the Sartre who had
dominated the post-war period, but a
mixture of Lévi-Strauss, Foucault, Althusser and Lacan. All passed for structuralists, although they were structuralists in different ways. The most refined
of the intelligentsia watched Godard’s
films, read Lacan without understanding him, and swore by the scientificity of
Althusser and acclaimed Lévi-Strauss’s
structuralism. Oddly, some of these
avant-garde intellectuals claimed to be
scientific with respect to ethnology or
economics, but Maoist when it came
to action. During the May period the
scientificity disappeared and the cult of
10

action, the cult of the cultural revolution, spread in various forms. Sartre and
Dialectical Reason, the groupe en fusion,
the revolutionary mob, had taken their
revenge on the structure of society.12

The intellectuals discussed by Aron
showed little regard for the fragility of
civilized order. They celebrated every assault on established authority as a victory
for personal freedom and authenticity.
One of the defining traits of the New
Left everywhere was its conflation of liberty with “liberation” and its willful refusal
to distinguish authority from authoritarianism. Nor was this a passing phase. In the
years after the May events, as Roger Kimball and Roger Scruton among others have
documented, “the thought of ’68” became
the official philosophy of the humanities
in universities throughout the Western
world. The scientism of the structuralists
gave way to radical social constructivism
and intemperate efforts to subvert—to
“deconstruct”—traditional wisdom and
established social institutions. Egalitarian
moralism coexisted with a fanatical repudiation of the idea of Truth, with a dogmatic insistence that morality and justice
have no other supports than the linguistic categories and cultural assumptions of
a contingent social order. The academic
partisans of “deconstruction” give no more
thought than their forebears in France to
the effects of such easy-going nihilism
on the capacity of free men and women
to live together in a spirit of responsibility and mutual respect. Without some sort
of grounding, “equality” and “justice” become will-o’-the-wisps, ideological slogans
to express contempt for a reality that does
not live up to the languid dreams of demiintellectuals.

the intercollegiate review / Fall 2008

Daniel J. Mahoney / 1968 and the Meaning of Democracy

“Social” Consequences of 1968
If the quasi-revolutionaries of ’68 failed
to replace the existing political order in
France, they were far more successful on
the “social” plane. It is a mistake to deny
altogether the real benefits that accompanied this upheaval. The democratization
of mores, the weakening of heavy-handed “paternalist” authority in the family,
Church, and political order, the growing
demands for genuine consultation between
employers and employees and rulers and
the ruled: all these did serve to revitalize
the democratic energies of modern society. These developments, legitimate within
limits as a corrective to the rigidities of a
traditional social order, were, however, well
underway before 1968. With the explosions
of May they took on a strikingly destructive cast. As Chantal Delsol has pointed
out, along with the (qualified) benefits that
flowed from the May events came excesses
of every kind. New ideologies were committed “to effac[ing] from the earth all the
authority of the old societies, with the goal
of installing their own.”13 This new authoritarianism was more illiberal than anything
found in the old order since it showed limitless contempt for the habits, practices, and
judgments that had long served to support
civilized human existence.
Alain Besançon also locates the deepest
meaning of 1968 in a broadly Tocquevillian framework. Besançon acknowledges
that the May movement had elements of
psychodrama. Some of its features were
indeed “accidental and insignificant.” But
its deepest meaning only became apparent
later. If the American and French revolutions installed democracy in the political
realm, “’68 has extended the field of democracy to the whole of the social order.”
With a comment (and pathos) worthy of
Tocqueville, Besançon notes that “the revolution is not finished.” By this he means
that the “democratic revolution” contin-

ues to transform and to undermine every
authoritative institution. Everything, including truth itself, must bow before the
tribunal of autonomy and consent.
The most convincing interpretations
of May ’68 bring together Aron’s political
perspective with a broadly Tocquevillian
appreciation for the ongoing effects of the
modern “democratic revolution.” At the
time of the May eruption Aron hesitated to
endorse André Malraux’s interpretation of it
as entailing the “end of a civilization.” This
kind of analysis seemed unduly apocalyptic to him. Ten years later, however, in his
In Defense of Decadent Europe, Aron freely
spoke of the May events as inaugurating a
“crisis of civilization,” a systematic assault
on all those authoritative institutions (e.g.
the Church, the army, the university) that
were necessary to sustain a free and civilized
human order. But rather than seeing May
’68 as the founding moment of authentic
democracy, Aron saw it as a profound “corruption” of the democratic principle.
This pregnant line of argument has
been developed by Dominique Schnapper, the distinguished French sociologist
and member of the French Constitutional Court (who is also Raymond Aron’s
daughter). She writes suggestively about
a “philosophy of in-distinction” that has
become widespread in the Western democratic world.14 The democratic principle of
human and civic equality has been radicalized, as Tocqueville predicted, into a
passion for equality that perceives “every
distinction...as discriminatory, every difference as inegalitarian, every inequality as
inequitable.” The relations between civic
equals which is at the heart of democratic
political life becomes the unchallenged
model for all human relations. Moreover,
a laudable respect for the accomplishments
of different cultures has given way to an
absolute relativism that denies the very
idea of universal moral judgments and a
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universal human nature. Such “extreme
equality,” as Montesquieu already called it
in Book 8 of The Spirit of the Laws, is a corruption of democracy lurking at the heart
of the “democratic” eruption that characterized May 1968.

The Revolution Continues
The problem confronting the West today is that this corruption or radicalization of democracy is too often confused
with democracy itself. In his magisterial
Tocqueville and the Nature of Democracy
Pierre Manent refers to democracy’s “immoderate friends,” who are also its worst
enemies. They are its enemies because
they undermine the distinctions necessary to preserve democracy’s moral health
and political vigor. In France today, a new
intellectual industry has arisen dedicated
to safeguarding the ideological legacy
of 1968. The partisans of “humanitarian
democracy” vehemently denounce critics
of 1968 and its legacy as “reactionaries,”
even as they deny there is any discernable
“pensée de 68.” A recent book, for example,
expresses venomous disdain for “la pensée
anti-68” even as it tries to save Aron (although only half-heartedly) for the camp
of “progress”! The important thing, its
author tells us, is to recognize 1968 as a
“precious moment,” the founding moment
of a democracy that broke down authoritarian mores, liberated social energies, and
defended citizenship in its new meaning as
“participation.”15 The old historicist appeal
to the camps of “progress” and “reaction”
lives on. But now everything stands or
falls not with one’s judgment of the Soviet
Union, the homeland of “socialism,” but
with one’s commitment to the memory—
and the “values”—of 1968. Somehow, I do
not see decisive progress.
The censorious response of the ideological guardians of 1968 to the slightest
12

criticism of their moral authority reflects
one of the most salient features of that
event: it undermined the moral and intellectual continuity of Western civilization. The partisans of 1968 date the birth
of a European democracy worthy of the
name—humanitarian, open, postnational, and postreligious—to the social upheavals of the late 1960s. The “old West,”
all the old worlds (as Charles Péguy might
put it), whether Christian, republican, or
classically liberal, are relegated to a “culpable past.” That past is suspect precisely
because it recognized the importance of
other values than “the rights of man” and
exhibited a now unacceptable toleration of
wars, colonialism, social paternalism, and
religious authoritarianism. At most, this
older liberal and Christian West is given
its limited due as the “prehistory” of a selfconfident, humanitarian, global democracy. More frequently, it is looked at warily
as a model to be studiously avoided.
The contemporary West which 1968
has bequeathed to us above all defines
itself by its adherence to “democratic values.” For a long time, however, the old and
new dispensations, political democracy
and older moral traditions and affirmations, coexisted without too much (practical) difficulty. In response to the inhuman
totalitarianisms of the Left and the Right
that were the scourge of the twentieth century, churchmen discovered the virtues
of liberal constitutionalism and political
liberals rediscovered the moral law at the
heart of Western civilization. Faced with
the totalitarian negation of constitutionalism, the moral law, and the very ideas of
unchanging truth and common humanity,
liberals and conservatives rallied in support of a West that was still able to draw
upon the best of both the modern and the
premodern traditions. 1968 shattered this
anti-totalitarian consensus and gave birth
to “postmodern democracy.”
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The relentless assault on the principle
of authority proceeds apace. This process
is so regularized that we have ceased to
notice or appreciate its truly revolutionary
character. Our political orders are bereft
of statesmanship, the family is a shell of its
former self, and influential currents within
the churches no longer know how to differentiate between the sublime demands
of Christian charity and demagogic appeals to democratic humanitarianism. Europeans have increasingly severed a legitimate and salutary concern for human
rights from its political context, which is
self-government within a territorial state
indebted to the broad traditions of civilization. They desire what Pierre Manent
calls “pure democracy.” They increasingly
defer to an “idea of democracy” which
has no tolerance for the crucial historical, cultural, and political prerequisites of
democratic self-government. 1968 played a
central role, as both cause and effect, in
this reduction of a capacious tradition of
liberty to an idea of democracy committed
to a single principle: the maximization of
individual autonomy and consent. One of
the enduring lessons of May 1968, therefore, is surely that the “idea” of democracy is never sufficient unto itself. As pure
abstraction or ideology, democracy risks
becoming a deadly enemy of self-government and of human liberty and dignity,
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On this point, see Raymond Aron, Thinking Politically: A Liberal in the Age of Ideology (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction,
1997), 207–211. For the chronology of the
May events, I have drawn on Aron and a
wide variety of other sources.
2. De Gaulle’s “Discours du 30 mai 1968” is
widely available on the internet.
3. La revolution introuvable can be found in
the best available anthology of Aron’s writings, Penser la liberté, penser la démocratie
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